The debate about shareholder capitalism has an unfortunate habit of becoming a clash of absolutes. In the 1980s and 1990s Michael Jensen and his followers argued that shareholder value was the secret sauce of management. In the wake of the 2007-8 financial crisis many influential management theorists declared that the secret sauce was in fact a deadly poison. The search is now on for a better way of measuring success and motivating managers.
There is no doubt that the cult of shareholder value produced perverse results. The fashion for linking remuneration to share prices allowed bosses to manipulate their shareprices to boost their income. The emphasis on short-term results rather than long-term health tempted companies to skimp on research and innovation (âlong term results cannot be gained by piling short-term results on short-term resultsâ Peter Drucker once remarked). There have been so many examples of the destructive side of share-holder capitalism that many of its high-priests have turned against it: even Jack Welch has pronounced that it is âthe dumbest idea on the planetâ.
But there is a danger of going too far in the opposite direction. None of the alternative systems of measurement that people have come up with are very compelling. One idea is âcustomer satisfactionâ. But isnât the best way to please customers to give everything away for nothing? And how can customer satisfaction take into account the interests of the people who risk their capital by investing in the company? Another idea is to rely on the judgement of managers. But isnât this tantamount to allowing children to mark their own homework? It is odd that people who worry that shareholder value has been manipulated by managers for their own benefit should argue that managers should be given more power rather than less.
Most critics of âshareholder capitalismâ embrace âstakeholder capitalismâ-that is a variety of capitalism which gives equal say to all the various constituencies in the business world from employees to communities. But this can easily become a recipe for all sorts of problems-from dithering as different constituencies manoeuvre for advantage to gamesmanship as clever managers manipulate gridlock for their own advantage. The stakeholder idea might have had some merit in a world where technological change was slower than it is today. But it has little relevance to a world where innovation is frequently disruptive and managers have to make unpopular decisions or miss the next wave.
The best way to deal with the issue of shareholder value is to reject the absolutists of both sides-the Calvinists of shareholder value and the Jesuits of stakeholder value as it were-and take a much more pragmatic approach. Shareholder value is a valuable tool. It provides us with a way of measuring a companyâs performance from the outside. But it is an equally bad master. The trick is to adjust the tool so that it does the job better rather than to caste it aside.
This can be done relatively easily-by making sure that we focus on long-term rather than short-term shareholder value. Bosses should be forced to hold their stock in companies for a few years before they can exercise their stock options. They should also be deprived of their freedom to exercise their stock options whenever they feel like it. This will give bosses a powerful incentive to boost the long-term health of the company (and hence the long-term health of their own portfolios) rather than a perverse incentive to game the system.
AUTHOR:
Adrian Wooldridge is The Economist‘s management editor and writes the Schumpeter column. He was previously based in Washington, DC, as the Washington bureau chief where he also wrote the Lexington column. Previously he has been The Economist‘s West Coast correspondent, management correspondent and Britain correspondent. He is the co-author of “The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea”, “A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalisation”, “Witch Doctors”, a critical examination of management theory, and “The Right Nation”, a study of conservatism in America. His most recent book is âMasters of Management: How the Business Gurus and their Ideas have Changed the World-for Better and for Worseâ.
I am not sure that it is that easy. This is what Mary Parker Follett would have called a conservative trade-off rather than an creative integration. Measurement is a means, but to what end? Adrian Wooldridge’s proposed compromise begs the questions; What is an enterprise? What is/are its purposes? How can we know whether it is fulfilling it/them?
Neoclassical economics is fundamentally a static model. Firms (the very name implies structure rather than movement) are seem as entities in equilibrium focused on single purposes that they are capable of maximizing (because there is just one purpose)
But suppose enterprises are complex processes, rather than just complicated systems. What if their purposes emerged, and developed and changed during their life cycles? What if managing a firm was more like managing an ecosystem than a machine? How would you measure the human analog of the Florida Everglades or the Mekong River Delta? How would you manage it?
Unless we start with better questions we are not going to get better answers…